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Statement of Interest of Amicus
State of New York
The instant cases, which will be heard together by this
Court, all involve the constitutionality of questioning and
limited protective searches for weapons by police officers
who have reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has
been .committed or is about to be committed. These questions are of direct and substantial interest to the Attorney
General of the State of New York. As the chief legal
officer of the State (N. Y. Executive Law § 63), c.h arged
with the defense of the enactments of our State Legislature (Executive Law § 71), the Attorney General is concerned with maintaining an equitable balance between effective
tive law enforcement to protect society against crime and
the observance of procedural due process in the administration of criminal justice.
Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, codifying the common law, establishes standards
defining the eircumstances lmder which citizens abroad
in a public place may be questioned as to their activities
ties. These standards serve the valid dual purpose of
protecting the individual from being formally charged
with .crime without prior opportunity to explain his actions,
and of permitting the prevention of crime before its commission. The statute permits a "frisk" for weapons only
where the police officer not only has facts upon which to
base a reasonable suspicion that a felony has or will be
committed, hut further facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that he may be attacked with a dangerous weapon.
We agree with and endorse fully the position taken by
the District Attorneys filing briefs with respect to their
defense of the New York Statute.
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Questions Presented
1. Whether § 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it authorizes a police officer to stop a person whom he reasonable suspects is committing or is about to commit a
felony and ask him for his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. Whether a180-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it authorizes a police officer who has reasonable grounds to
suspect that a felony has been or will be committed, to
conduct a limited search of a person only where there are
reasonable grounds to suspect that such person may
threaten the officer with a dangerous weapon.
3. Whether § 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure is constitutional on its face, but was improperly
applied to the cases of -RKQF. Peters v. State of New
York, and Nelson Sibron v. State of New York.
4. Whethera State court judgment permitting a police
officer pursuant to common law to question persons reasonably suspected to be committing a felony or .about to commit a felony and to conduct a limited search for weapons,
evidence found being inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding, violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Summary of Argument
I. Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure codifies the common law right of a police officer to
question any individual in a public place where there is a
1·easonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or
is about to be committed. People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d
540

4
441 (1964). This power to question is a necessary element

in crime prevention; without it, investigativeleads would
be irreparably lost and emergency situations could not be
properlyhandled.

The state and federal cases upholding this right under
common law or statute make clear that a brief inquiry
cannot be equated with an arrest. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.
2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Vita, 294 F.
2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.
Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) , reversed on other grounds
285 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); People v. Rivera, supra;
Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A. 2d 170 (1957). Arrest,
which requires an officer to have probable cause to believe
a crime has been committed, necessarily entails being
taken into custody to answer for a crime, with the charges
permanently entered on police records. Cannon v. 6WDWH
53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961).
A brief detention of a suspicious person enables the officer to evaluate the situation and in turn enables the individual detained to explain his actions without the
~rubarrassment, incom·enience and expense of being formally charged with crime. United States v. Themas, 250
F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); U.nited Sta.tes v. Vita, supra;
Canno•n v. State, supra.; K ava·nagh v. Stenhouse, 98 R. I.
252, 174 A. 2d 560 (1961).
II. A limited protective "frisk" of a suspect is permitted under Section 180-a only where there are facts upon
which to base a reasonable suspicion that the person being
questioned is armed and may use his weapon. The regulations issuE>d by the X ew York State Combined Council
of Law Enforcement Officials in connection with the statute
specifically provide: ·'Not e~eryone may be searched;
searches are only permitted when the officer reasonably
suspects he is in danger.''
Such a protective search, based upon self-preservation~
cannot be unreasonable and thus cannot Yiolate the stric-
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tures of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v.
Rabinou:itz, 33D U. S. 56 (1950); Elkins v. United States,
364 U. S. 206 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 147 (1924).
III. Since a precautionary seard1 for weapons js valid,
evidence obtained pursuant to it can be admitted in a
criminal prosecution. People v. R £vera.. supra; People v.
One 1958 Chevrolet, 5 Cal. Reptr. 128, 133 (2d District,
1960) . °Jf(tpp v. Ohi-0, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) is inapposite,
since it is based upon the rationale that if evidence could
be freely used regardless of how it was found, police officers might be encouraged to use unlawful crime detection
methods. As to the instant statute~ however, an officer who
reasonably fears danger should not and cannot be deterred
from "frisking" a suspect. Abuses of the right to c.onduct
protective searches pursuant to ' ' reasonable suspicion''
can be checked by the courts in the same manner as abuses
by officers claiming ''probable cause' ' to believe a crime
has been committed.
IV. Ho,vever, assuming arguendo, that this Court
should regard admission of evidence found in such limited
searches as violative of the Fourth Amendment, it is respectfully submitted that the stop and defensive "frisk"
authorized by Section 180-a should still be approved and
upheld. Defensive searches are qualitatively different
from any other kind of search, since they- do not seek evidence of crime. They are merely a necessary adjunct to
the well-established right to make inquiry pursuant to reasonable suspicion. Since this is a relatively new statutory
conception, this Court could permit the reasonable limited
search but fashion an appropriate rule concerning admissibility of evidence. This approach has been taken by the
Court of Appeals in State of Ohio v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.
2d 122, 214 N'. E. 2d 114 (1966) .
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POINT I
A police officer's power to question any person
whom he reasonably suspects has committed or is about
to commit a felony, has already been established as
valid under State and Federal Law, and brief detention pursuant to this power is not an arrest.
As stated by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in its Task Force
Report on The Police (U. S. Government Printing Office,
1967), at page 1:
''The heart of the police effort against crime is
patrol-moving on foot or by vehicle around an assigned area, stopping to check buildings, to survey
possible incidents, to question suspicious persons or
simply ·t o converse with residents who may provide intelligence as to ·occurrences in the neighborhood.''
This common law right to question-in response to
suspicious circumstances which may not be sufficient to
create probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed-has been codified in Section 180-a of the New
York Code of Criminal Procedure.
The legislative history of the statute indicates its dual
function of facilitating reasonable crime prevention
methods and protecting the individual:
' ' Legalizing the questioning and searching of a suspect so that it does not constitute an arrest is to the
advantage of both the police and the public. When an
officer stops a person and questions him, he is often
in doubt whether such acts constitute an arrest. If
they do the officer is subjecting himself and his employer to the possibility of a suit for false arrest.
Whenever an innocent person is arrested, charged with
a crime, and brought before a magistrate, his reputa-
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tion is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly inconvenienced
and put to considerable expense.'' N. Y. State Legislative Annual, 1964, A. I. 1859~ Pr. 3025, page 67,
Volker.
The rationale supporting police authority to question and
investigate was clearly set out by the New York Court
of Appeals in People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 444
(1964):
''The authority of the police to stop defendant and
question him in the circumstances shown is perfectly
clear. The business of the police is to prevent crime
if they can. Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual street action is an indispensable police power
in the orderly government of large urban communities.
It is a prime function of city police to be alert to
things going on in the streets . . . If they were denied the right of such summary inquiry, a normal
power and a necessary duty would be closed off.''
It is not difficult to conceive of examples illustrating

the urgent necessity for the power to inquire, even in
circumstances where probable cause for arrest may not
exist. If a police officer heard shots coming from a certain street and saw a man running from that direction, no
reasonable person could doubt that it would be the officer's
duty to stop the person running and determine his identity
and the reason for his actions, rather than allow him to
disappear. Or, if an anonymous telephone call warned a
detective that a man with a red jacket would be setting
off a bomb in a certain school, it would be the detective's
obligation to question a man fitting the description seen on
the school's premises.
This kind of emergency situation was incisively analyzed
by the American Law Institute in ''A Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure, Tentative Draft No. 1 '' 19'65,
pp. 96-97 [President's Commission on Law Enforcement
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and Administration of Justice in its Task Force Report
on The Police (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), at
p. 184]:

''If, as some have argued, the only power to restrain

a person, even briefly, is by arresting him on reasonable grounds to believe him guilty of a crime, the
police will be foreclosed from responding to confused
emergency situations in the way that seems most natural and rational. For in such circumstances, where
a crime may have been committed and a suspect or
important witness is about to disappear, it seems irrational to deprive the officer of the opportunity to
'freeze' the situation for a short time, so that he may
make inquiry and arrive at a considered judgment
about further action to be taken. To deny the police
such a power would be too high a price in effective
policing and in the police's respect for the good sense
of the rules that govern them, in order to avoid brief
inconvenience that most innocent persons would be
prepared to undergo.''
And as was observed by the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in its
Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact-An Assessment (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967) at p. 94:
''If the police were forbidden to stop persons at the
scene of a crime, or in situations that strongly suggest criminality, investigative leads could be lost as
persons disappeared into the massive impersonality
of an urban environment.''
Some States have established by statute the right of
-police officers to stop and question suspects for a reasonable time. General Laws of Rhode Island§ 12-7-1 (1956);
New Jlampshire Revised Statutes, Ch. 594, § 2 (1955) ; 11
Delaware Code, § 1902 (1953); Massachusetts General
Laws, Ch. 41, § 98 ( 1961).
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Case law also supports a common law as well as a statutory right to question upon reasonable suspicion. See
People v. Rivera, su.pra; People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106,
293 P. 2d 52 (1956); People v. Jones, 176 Cal App. 2d
265, 1 Cal. R. 210 (1959); People v. Faginkr(Jlfl,tz, 21 Ill.
2d 75, 171 N. E. 2d 5 (1961); State ex rel. Branchivnd v.
Hedman, 269 Minn. 375, 130 N. W. 2d 628 ( 1964) ; State
v. Hope, 85 N. J. Super. 551, 205 A. 2d 457 (A. D. 1964);
State v. Bell 89 N. J. Super. 437, 215 A. 2d 369 (A. D.
1965); People v. Hewnerman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N. E. 2d 649
(1937); Hueb.ner v. State, 33 Wisc. 2d 505, 147 N. W. 2d
646 (1967); Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A. 2d 170
(1957); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.
2d 873 (1966); Goss v. State, - - Alaska - - , 390 P.
2d 220 (1964), cert. denied 379 U. S. 859 (1964); City of
Portland v. iGoodwin, 187 Ore. 409, .'210 P. 2d 577 (1949);
State v. Freeland, 255 Ia. 1334, 125 N. W. 2d 825 (1964);
State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N. W . 2d 327 (1963);
City of South E·u,clid v. DiFranco, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 215,
206 N. E. 2d 432 (11un. Ct., S. Euclid, Ohio, 1965);
State v. Hatfield, 112 vV. Ya. 424, 164 S. E. 518 (1932);
Commonwealth v. Roy, 349 Mass. 224, 207 N. E. 2d 284
(Sup. Ct., Norfolk, Mass. ~ 1965); State v. };foore, - - Del.
- - , 187 A. 2d 807 (Superior Court, Del., 1963) ; De
Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A. 2d 244 (1960); State
v. Chronister, - - Okla-. - -, 353 P. 2d 493 (1960); Commo·nwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N. E. 2d 840 (1964);
Kav anagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R. I. 252~ 174 A. 2d 560 (1961);
People v. Beasley, - - Cal. App. 2d - - , 58 Cal. Repor.
485 (1967); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J . 460, 231 A. 2d 353
(1967); Wendelboe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P . 2d
178 (1960) .
Federal court decisions supporting the power to detain
suspicious persons briefly for an explanation of their actions, have distinguished between such detentions and
arrests. In Wils-0n v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412, 414-415 (9th
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Cir., 1966), the Court held:
''While it is clear that at the time appellee 's car was
pulled over probable cause for an arrest did not exist,
it is also clear that not every time an officer sounds
his siren or flashes a light to flag down a vehicle has
an arrest been made. The initial act of stopping appellee 's car was not an arrest. Granting that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures makes no distinction between informal
detention without cause and formal arrest without
cau.se, there is a difference between that 'cause' which
would justify informal detention short of arrest and
the probable cause standing required to justify that
kind of custody traditionally deno·m inated an arrest.

•

•

•

We take it as settled that there is nothing ips-0 facto
unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under
circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes
of limited inquiry in the course of routine investigations.''
The court made clear that there must be a suspicion based
upon facts from which it can determine that the detention
was not arbitrary or harassing.
And in United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir.,
1961), where appellant was asked to come to FBI headquarters to answer questions, and was told that he was not
under arrest and could leave whenever he chose, the Second
Circuit ruled:
''Private citizens who are detained may not, of course,
be compelled to answer the questions of the authorities
if they wish to remain silent. And the reasonableness
of the time for which a person is detained necessarily
depends upon his continued willingness to cooperate
in answering questions. Most persons, even hardened
criminals, will not refuse to cooperate altogether; they
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are far more likely to talk and make a pretense of
cooperation.''
The District Court commented in United States v.
B<manno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y., 1960), reversed
on other grounds 285 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir., 1961):
''I believe that the relative dearth of authority in point
can be explained by the fact that few litigants have
ever seriously contended that it was illegal for an
officer to stop and question a person unless he had
'probable cause' for formal arrest.

•

•

•

. . . It cannot be contended that every detention of an
individual is such a 'seizure'. If that were the case,
police investigation would be dealt a crippling blow,.
by imposing a radical sanction unnecessary for the
protection of a free citizen. See also United States
v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y., 1966; Lipton
v. United States, 348 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir., 1965)."

The court in United States v. Vita, supro, notes the
advantage to a citizen who may answer questions and give
a satisfactory account of himself without being formally
charged before his explanations are considered. The same
conclusion was arrived at in United States v. Thomas, 250
F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y., 1966), where the Court held at
pages 794-95 :
''To the innocent person seeking to avoid the consequences of arrest, a reasonable period of detention
during which he can explain his actions and vindicate
himself is a welcome right and but a minor inconvenience as compared to arrest.''
The New York courts have also upheld this distinction.
The Court of Appeals in People v. Rivera, supra, 14 N. Y.
2d at p. 445 (1964), citing People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600
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(1915)' ruled:
the evidence needed to make the inquiry is not
of the same degree or conclusiveness as that required
for an arrest. The stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the
police may make the inquiry may be less incriminating
than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to
have been committed. It is enough for the purposes
of this case to rule that the police were justified in the
record as here developed in stopping and questioning
defendant.''
'' •

•

r.

This analysis accords with New York's definition of arrest as contained in § 167 of the N. Y. Code of Criminal
Procedure, Supp. amended 1967 :
''Arrest is the taking of a person into custody that
he may be held to answer for an offense."
Other jurisdictions are in accord. See e.g. Cannon v.
State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961); Cornisfh v. State,
supra; Bl,ager v. State, 162 Md. 664, 161A.1 (1932); Huebner v. State, supra; Commonwealth v. Hicks, si"pra.
Nor do this Court's decisions in Rios v. United States,
364 U. S. 253 (1960), Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98
(1959), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949),
equate a stop with an arrest. In Henry the prosecution
conceded that an arrest took place when federal agents
stopped a car in which cartons of whiskey were then found.
Thus, the sole remaining question was whether the arrest
took place pursuant to probable cause. Since this Court's
language at page 103 ("for purposes of this case") appears to confine the decision to the circumstances concededly presented, there is no basis to infer that an arrest
takes place whenever a car is stopped and the driver is
asked to show a driver's license. Thus, the case cannot
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support the proposition that no car may be stopped under
any circumstances without probable cause.
The Rios case explicitly recognized the right to stop and
question. At page 262 this Court noted:
"But the Government argues that the policemen approached the standing taxi only for the purpose of
routine interrogation, and that they had no intention
to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission. If the petitioner thereafter
voluntarily revealed the package of narcotics to the
officers' view, a lawful arrest could then have been
supported by their reasonable cause to believe that a
felony was being committed in their presence. The
validity of the search thus turns upon the narrow
question of when the arrest occurred, and the answer
to that question depends upon an evaluation of the
conflicting testimony of those who were there that
night.''

It is apparent that the idea of detention for routine investigation was accepted as· not amounting to an arrest,
since this Court remanded the case for determination of
the point at which arrest occurred.
In Brinegar probable cause was found and there was no
need to discuss or consider the power to stop cars merely
for investigatory purposes.
It is not difficult to predict that, if police officers are
deprived of the right to question persons abroad in a public place upon reasonable suspicion, they will be compelled
to deal 'vith suspicious circumstances by making arrests
which the courts might be reluctant to hold improper. Thus
the standard of probable cause for arrest will be substantially diluted. Ironically, this is the result predicted by
counsel for appellant Sibron if the police are permi-tted to
investigate informally. Logic compels the analysis arrived
at in Gilbert v. United States, 366 F . 2d 923 (9th Cir., 1966),
550
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where the Court at page 928 notes that substantial con~iderations faYor recognition of a carefully limited right of
brief police detention on less than probable cause:
''If even slight interference with freedom of personal
movement is invariably conditioned upon a showing of
prior probable cause, then either the standard of
probable cause will be lowered, and with it the protection against formal arrests and substantial inter£erences with liberty . . . or police activity which appears perfectly proper when measured against a
standard of reasonableness will nonetheless be forbidden. ''
See in accord United States v. Thomas, supra., 250 F.
Supp. at page 796:
"If the police seek to justify their actions as an arrest
based upon probable cause, the dangers are great. For
if the concept of probable cause is expanded to cover
these necessary though ambiguous cases, the e:ffect
will be to widen the power of the police to visit upon
persons the consequences of arrest when such should
not be done. Thus the constitutional standard of
probable cause prior to an arrest, and the protection it
affords, will be diluted to the point that situations warranting a stop~ question and detention will be considered an arrest though such should not be the case. ''
Judicial proscription of the common law right to ''stop"
would thus create an intolerable dilemma. Either the
public would be deprived of the right to be protected by
brief police questioning of suspicious persons, or the rights
of citizens whose questioning would be termed an arrest
(and entered on police records) would be defeated.
Cannon v. State, s·upra.
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POINT II
The right to stop and inquire includes a corollary
right to self-protection.

A recent study indicated that of the suspects questioned
in a public place by police officers, 10% were armed with
knives and 10% were carrying guns. Albert J. Weiss, Jr.,
''Personal and Property Searches in Radio Dispatched
Police Work : An Overview of the Data from Three Cities ' '
(Ann Arbor: University of Michiga.n, 1966) pages 4-6.
Professor Allen P. Bristow has conducted a study that
has indicated that the failure to make a proper search is
a circumstance in 19% of the cases in which police officers
are shot. Bristow, Allen P. "Police Officer Shootings-A
Tactical Evaluation'' 54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Poliee Science, 1963, page 95. Analysis of the
particular circumstances under which police officers are
in the greatest danger showed that where suspects were
stopped in Yehicles, the greatest hazard of a police officer's
being shot occurred after his approach and while he was
(1) issuing a citation, (2) interrogating or (3) using his
radio (Bristow, pp. 93-94).
The risk of injury increases with the degree of urbanization in the community. As was found in the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice in its Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact-An Assessment~ supra, page 141:
' ' Offenders from areas of slight or moderate urbanism
in contrast to offenders from areas of extensive urbanism are not frequently definite criminal social types,
characterized by criminal techniques, criminal argot
and a definite progressive criminal life history, at least
prior to prison experience.''
Even without such studies and statistics, there can be no
valid legal basis for depriving police officers, as opposed
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to other categories of persons, of the right to self-defense.
This right can best be implemented by permitting protective searches in cases where the officer has reasonable
grounds to suspect that the person he is questioning is
armed and might use a weapon against him. Counsel for
appellant Sibron admits at the outset (brief, p. 34) that a
police officer who feels threatened will search for weapons:
'' . . . He will frisk to protect his life no matter what
a statute authorizes or what the court decisions say.
His instinct for self-preservation will dictate his course
of action.''
It is difficult to conceive of how such a limited protective
search can be called unreasonable--and unreasonableness
is the sole basis upon which a search may be invalidated
under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U. S. 56 (1950); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206
(1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 147 (1924).
It should be noted at the outset that, contrary to the
erroneous implications in appellant Sibron 's brief, the statute in question sets up a two-fold requirement. First it
provides that the officer have facts upon which to base a
reasonable suspicion that someone in a public place may
be committing or be about to commit a felony. Second, he
must have further facts upon which to base his reasonable
suspicion that he may be in danger of life or limb if he
does not search this person for a dangerous weapon. This
suspicion can be based upon the suspect 's actions, bulges
in clothing, or sudden movements. Other factors are summarized in Detection of Crime, Lawrence P. Tiffany, Donald :\I. ~Iacintyre, Jr., and Daniel L. Rotenberg. (Little
Brown & Co., Boston, 1967) at page 48:

"Whether regular patrol officers conduct a frisk depends somewhat on the size and age of the suspect or
suspects~ the crime suspected, the relative isolation of
the area in which the stop is made, the amount of light,
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whether the officer is alone, how many suspects are
detained, and other similar factors.''
To overcome the obvious difficulty in taking the position
that officers may not prevent attack upon themselves by a
weapons search, appellant Sibron contends that the statute
in question authorizes not merely the limited "frisk" but
all types of searches. The case of People v. Taggart, 20
N. Y. 2d 335 (1967), is cited as reversing the rule created in
People v. Rivera, sivpra, and People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d
238 (1966), carefully limiting the permissible ''frisks" authorized under § 180-a.
However, Taggart has not removed the restrictions on
the kinds of searches permissible under the statute. The
case involved unusual circtunstances which the concurring
opinion of Justice Van Voorhis compared to an officer's
reasonable suspic.ion that someone is carrying a bomb on
an airplane. In Taggart, a detective had received an anonymous telephone call exactly describing a young man who
would be at a certain corner 'Yith a revolver in his lefthand jacket pocket. The detective observed a man at the
location indicated, fitting the complete description given
and standing in the middle of a group of children. The
officer reached into the pocket described and found the reYolver. The Court based its decision permitting more
than a ''frisk'' upon the unusual circumstances-the telephone call indi<>atinp; the exact location of the weapon and
the danger to the children:
"It would seem unreasonable to require an officer in
that situation to engage in a preparatory and undoubtedly dangerous frisk-particularly in view of the
fact that the defendant was standing in the middle of
a group of children at the time of the search.'' (at p.
343).

MoreoveL the corroboration provided by the suspect 's
location and appearance was virtually tantamount to sup554
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plying "probable cause" to belieYe that he possessed a revolver. See Draper v. U.S., 358 U. S. 307 (1959).
The purpose of a weapons search and the method of
carrying it out were well swnmarized in Pe opk v. Rii;era.,
supra, 14 N. Y. 2d at page 447:
1

"Ultimately the validity of the frisk narrows down to
whether there is or is not a right by the police to
touch the person questioned. The sense of exterior
touch here involved is not very far different from the
sense of sight or hearing-senses upon which police
customarily act.
The fact that the police detective actually found a
gun in defendant's possesion is neither decisive nor
material to the constitutional point in issue. The question is not what was ultimately found but whether there
was a right to find anything.''
was found by Riehard Kuh~ "Reflections on New
York's 'Stop and Frisk Law' And Its Claimed Unconstitutionality," 56 Journal of C,riminal Law C. & P. S. 32
(1965), p. 37:
A$

''Customary police self-protective practice is all that
is authorized by the 'Stop and Frisk' law: A 'patting
down' for bulky objects that may be guns or knives,
followed by a reaching into clothing or a turning out
of pockets only when such solid bulges have been located. Concealed non-bulky contraband is not ordinarily legally discoverable in such a seareh; there would
be no way of discovering it other than the rare o:ffchance of its being jointly pocketed with the weaponlike bulge.''
The regulations issued by the New York State Combined
Council of Law Enforcement Officials at the time Section
180-a was enacted permit onl~· an external frisk. It is
further provided that ''Not everyone stopped may be
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searched; searches are permitted only when the officer
reasonably suspects he is in danger.'' The officer cannot
compel an an8'ver to his questions, cannot compel the
suspect to produce proof of his identity, and must explain
with particularity how a suspect 's attitudes and answers
were unsatisfactory if he chooses to make an arrest on
the basis of these answers or attitudes. An officer attempting to stop a suspect may not use his weapons or nightstick in any fashion, but may only interpose his own body.
Similarly, recent additions to Section 35.30 of the New
York Penal Law restrict and define the situations in which
an officer who has reasonable cause to believe that someone has committed a crime may use physical force to prevent attack or escape. These regulatory and penal law
provisions, read together with the statute at bar, all attest
to the good faith and effectiveness of the State's attempt
-to develop crime prevention methods which will pose minimum hazard or inconvenience to the innocent and maximum standards of due process for law-breakers.
In view of the proscription in New York law against
police use of armed force in ''stop'' cases, it would be
totally unreasonable and unwarranted to impose upon such
offioors the additional burden of being forbidden to engage
in defensive searches. As was said by Glanville Williams
in "Police Detention and Arrest Privilege-England'', 51
J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 413, 418 (1960), in relation to the
power to frisk :
"It might be regarded as a reasonable extension
of the existing law of self-defense, or as an applica"
tion of the doctrine of nec-essity
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POINT III
Evidence obtained pursuant to Section 180..a is admissible in a criminal prosecution.

Appellant Sibron admits, at pages 42-43 of the brief,
that it is difficult to argue that the statute in question
is unconstitutional based upon its text and the regulations
issued when the statute was enacted. However, he argues
that the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in
Peters and Sibron have construed the statute in such a
manner that it violates the Fourth Amendment. Whatever the merits of appellants' contentions that the statute
was improperly applied to them, the fact cannot be obscured that this Court has before it the validity of the
statute on its face, not only instances of its application
to particular convictions. See Lovelace v. Unued States,
357 F. 2d 306 (5th Cir., 1966); SJvuttlesworlh v. Birmingham B oard of Ed11ca.tion, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N. D. Ala.
1958), aff'd 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Capooth v. United States,
238 F. Supp. 583 (S. D., Texas, 1965).
The care with which the rights of the public are protected by the statutory language is evident in the previously described requirement that a police officer not
only ha\-e a reasonable suspicion that a felony has been
or i$ about to be committed, but also that he may not
conduct a ''frisk' ' without facts upon which to base a
rf'\asonable suspicion that he is in dang.er of attack. Thus
there is no relation to the arbitrary general searches condemned in Caniara v. Mwnicipal Court, 387 U. S. 523
(1967), ,·d1ich appellant Sibron fallaciously attempts to
cite as apposite to this case.
It is clear from this Court's decisions in such cases as
Brinega.r v. U. 8., su.pra., Carroll v. U. 8., sulpra, and
U. 8. v. Rabinoioitz, supra., that the reasonableness of a
search must be tested by the circumstances which have
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occasioned it. Where these circumstances include demonstrabl-e elements of personal danger to a police officer, it
is obvious from the standpoint of law and logic that a
protective search is not onl~- proper but inexorably necessary. State v. Dilley, su.pra.; P eople. '"· Jlachel., 234 Cal.
App. 2d 37, 44 Cal. Reptr. 126, 130-32 (1965), cert. denied
382 lT. S. 839 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hicks, su.pra.
Since such a search is valid there is no reason to requir-e
officers to discard contrahand which may accidentally be
f ounrl in the course of such a search.
As was held in P eople v. One 19:'58 Cllevrolc>t, 5 Cal. Reptr.
128, 133 (2d District, 1960) :
" . . . the finding of the [marijuana] cigarette was
incidental to the precantionary SClan•h for weapons.
The officers had the r ight to ma]-:(' ::n-1.ch precautionary
search, and they were not required to overlook marijuana which came to their notice during such search.''
See in accord P eople '"· Rivera, supra.
Appellant 8ibron uses tlie case of Jlapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), as a springboard in his attempt to change
New York law so that such contraband cannot be admitted
into eYidence again~t a def<-'ndant regardless of the necessity for the search through which it was obtained. HowCYer, the rationale of 111.app is inapplicable to this case.
An officer who-in good faith ba::;ed npou particular factsf ears danger to him:;elf ::;hould not <.md cannot he deterred from "frisking" a person detained. Thus! inadmissibility of 0vidence ~o ohtained would not serve as a
deterrt'nt to such a "frisk." Jlapp was predicated upon
the fact that if evidence could be frt>l:'ly used regardless
of how it was found, police officers would he encouraged
to utilize unlmdul methods of crime detection. Such considerations eannot he present here and! therefore! the only
rt'snlt of t'xrluding contraband found pursuant to ;'frisk8"
would be to permit continuation of -violations of State law
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by suspects without changing the .p attern of police defensive measures.
Appellant Sibron contends (at p. 36) that some police
officers will search in the absence of any need for selfprotection, in spite of the specific prohibition against such
conduct in the regulations issued by the New York State
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials. It should
be noted at the outset that such an occurrence could not
invalidate the State's right to provide for "stops" and
"frisks". As was said in U.nited Sta.tes v. Y.ita, su.pra, 294
F. 2d at page 530:
"But the possibility that powers given to law enforcement officers may be abused does not require Government agents to be left powerless to make reasonable
inquiry.''
The crux of the question is whether the standard contained in the instant statute is sufficiently definite to prodde a basis for court review which customarily and traditionally checks abuses and misuses of authority by police
officers. Appellant Sibron repeatedly asserts that whilfl
the standard of "probable cause" to believe a crime has
been committed is distinct and precise, the term '' reasonable suspicion'' in the context of Section 180-a lacks
such precision. Analysis demonstrates precisely the contrary-both standards are eapable of similar review and
affirmation by the courts.
In Brinegar v. United States, s·u prn, this Court
"probable cause" as follows (338 U.S. at 175):

defin~d

''In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very

name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical: they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is correlative to what must be proved.''
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The criterion of "reasonable ground for belief of guilt"
is adopted with approval at page 175, citing Carroll v.
United States, supra, 261 U. S. at p. 161; Husty v. United
States, 282 U. 8. 694, 700-701 (1931); Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U. S. 435, 441 (1925); Steele v. United States
No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 504-505 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97
u. s. 642, 645 (1878).
And in Henry v. United Sta.t es, sitpra (361 U. S. at p.
102), the particular circumstances are again emphasized:
''We turn then to the question whether prudent men
in the shoes of these officers (Brinegar v. United
States, supra (338 U. S. at 175) ), would have seen
enough to permit them to believe that petitioner was
violating or had violated the law.''
The statute .before this Court can be judged and approved by substantially the same criteria as used in
Rabinowitz and Henry: would a prudent man in the shoes
of a particular police officer have seen enough to permit a
reasonable suspicion that petitioner was violating or about
to violate the law. .This standard is not "vague and unworkable'' nor does it leave the permissible conduct to the
unfettered discretion of the police officer.
As in "probable cause" cases, the officer must indicate
the facts upon which his reasonable suspicion was based
(See also regulations cited infra at Point II), both as to
his reason for stopping a suspect and as to his reason
for frisking him. Since the standard is entirely factual
and situational, appellant Sibron 's contention that the
courts would always permit a policeman to conduct a defensive search must be rejected. The courts would require
the officer to justify the "frisk" on the basis of the particular situation in which he was involved and the particular
suspect's acts.
Appellant Sibron argues that (brief, p. 26) :
" . . . The only possible conduct not held reasonably
suspect is the perfectly normal.''
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The implication is that the statute permits invasions of
privacy occasioned solely by non-conformity-that any unusual factor in appearance or behavior may be the basis
for harassment.
The fallacy in this argument is apparent. To say that
normal behavior would not give rise to questions does not
mean that the converse is true. Many forms of behavior,
such as singing operatic arias while strolling down Fifth
Avenue, might be unusual and unconventional, but would
certainly not lead to a reasonable suspicion that a felony
was about to be committed. Ultimately, the police officer's
juclgn1ent, ,,-bile built upon greater experience than the
average person 's, will be checked against the court's standard a s to what other prudent men might have done.

POINT IV
The right to stop and question can be reviewed independently of the question of the admissibility of
contraband.

The Fourth Amendment cases which have held that in
order to be admissible in a state or federal prosecution,
evidence must have been obtained pursuant to probable
cause, were predicated upon searches wholly different from
that envisioned by the instant statute. Mapp v. Ohio,
supra; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1967);
Carroll v. United States, S'l.tpra; United States v. Rabinowitz, supra. However, these cases clearly emphasize the
reasonableness of the search as the crucial factor and,
therefore, their rationale leads to the conclusion that evidence accidentally found as a result of a lawful protective
search by a police officer must be admissible in evidence.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the above cited cases
were read to require probable cause in addition to reasonableness before evidence can be admissible in a criminal
proceeding, regardless of the grounds for the limited search
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in question, it is respectfully ·submitted that this Court
should still approve and uphold the stop and defensive
search authorized by Section 180-a.
Protective searches are qualitatively different from any
other kind of search. They do not seek evidence of crime
or the fruits of crime, but are merely a mechanical adjunct to the well-established common law right to make
inquiry where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that
a felony has been or will be committed. The searches previously considered by this Court have been intricately
connected with gathering evidence. Searches incident to
arrest are sometimes categorized as protective, but they
serve the equally important function of preventing destruction of the evidence of crime by the arrested person. See,
e.g. Carroll v. U. S . supra; Agnello v. U. 8., 269 U. S.
20 (1925) .
No such motivation or purpose is contemplated in the
instant statute. Search is permitted and provided for only
because it is a necessary corollary to the right to stop.
Police officers cannot quest!on without being secure in their
own safety. Since this is a relatively new statutory conception, this Court could permit the reasonable search but
develop an appropriate rule concerning admissibility of
contraband found. 1 Cf. Musselman, H ·ulJ-Brake Co. v.
Comm. of Internal Revenue, 139 F. 2d 65 (6th Cir., 1943),
where two contradictory provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code were construed; Sha.piro v. United States, 335 U. S.
1 (1948), rehearing denied 335 U. S. 836 (1948); Clouse
v. Am.cricmi JJ.1itual Liability I nsurance Co., 232 F. Supp.
1010 (E. D., S. Car., 1964).
This approach has been taken by the Court of Appeals
of Ohio in the decisions below in State of Ohio v. Terry.
Even under this rationale, an indictment for illegal possession
of weapons (as opposed to other fonns of contraband) would not
violate the spirit of the rule this Court would fashion.
1
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The reasoning of the Court (214 N. E. 2d at p. 120) was
as follows:
''However, we must be careful to distinguish that the
'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for a
dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search
for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else
in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such
a search is controlled by the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential.
White v. United States (1959), 106 U. S. App. D. C.
246, 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold that, on the
facts presented in the instant case, the frisk for dangerous weapons was valid as an incident to a valid
inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided
upon its ow-n facts.''
The Court added at pages 121-122:
''The States are not precluded from developing 'workable rules' governing arrest, searches and seizures to
meet the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and la\v enfox:cement, provided those rules
do not violate the constitutional proscriptions against
unreasonable searches and the concomitant command
that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who
has standing to complain. Ker v. State of California
(1963), 374 U. S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726;
Beck v. State of Ohio (1964), 379 U. S. 89, 85 S. Ct.
223. ''
It is respectfully urged that no possible balancing of
interests could lead to the conclusion that vital investigatory functions must be suppressed by the courts, or that
the police officer should be required to pursue his questioning without disarming a suspect who in the particular
circumstances would gh-e a prudent man reasonable suspicion to believe that his life was endangered.
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CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality
of Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure should be upheld, and the common law right
to stop and disarm pursuant to reasonable suspicion
should be affirmed.
Dated: New York, New York, October 25, 1967.
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